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Foreign Official Immunity After
Samantar
Chimène I. Keitner∗
ABSTRACT
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) does not govern the immunity of foreign officials from
legal proceedings in U.S. courts. Part I of this symposium
contribution seeks to put in sharper focus exactly what is, and
what is not, in dispute following Samantar. Part II presents
three challenges to common assumptions about conduct-based
immunity, which I consider under the headings of personal
responsibility, penalties, and presence. Under the heading of
personal responsibility, I emphasize that state responsibility
and individual responsibility are not mutually exclusive. Under
penalties, I argue that civil immunity and criminal immunity
are not fundamentally distinct. Under presence, I emphasize
that a defendant who enters the forum state’s territory might
justifiably have a weaker claim to conduct-based immunity than
one who does not. Part III suggests some factors that should
guide lower courts in determining an individual defendant’s
entitlement to immunity going forward.
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The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Samantar v. Yousuf
vindicated the U.S. government’s consistent position that current or
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former foreign officials cannot claim immunity under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).1 Under Samantar, individual
official immunity (as opposed to state immunity) is a matter of
common law, and is not necessarily commensurate with the immunity
of the state.2 It now falls to the lower courts to define the role of the
Executive and the precise contours of official immunity.
Part I of this contribution seeks to put in sharper focus exactly
what is, and what is not, in dispute following Samantar. Even outside
the FSIA, most individual immunity claims will fall into wellrecognized categories of immunity (or lack thereof), and thus present
fairly straightforward questions for adjudication. That said, it is
precisely the few remaining contentious claims that pose the
thorniest questions, because they implicate competing concerns for
ensuring individual accountability and providing a forum for victims
(which push towards less immunity), and avoiding foreign relations
conflicts and protecting U.S. officials from legal proceedings in foreign
courts (which push towards greater immunity).3
Part II presents three challenges to common assumptions about
conduct-based immunity,4 which I consider under the headings of
personal responsibility, penalties, and presence. Under the heading of
personal responsibility, I emphasize that state responsibility and
individual responsibility are not mutually exclusive. This pushes
against the view that the only relevant question for determining an
individual’s entitlement to conduct-based immunity is whether the

1.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611
(2006). For the U.S. government’s position on the scope of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunity Act (FSIA), see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Affirmance, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555) [hereinafter United
States Samantar Amicus Brief]; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Affirmance, Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-2579-cv)
[hereinafter United States Matar Amicus Brief]; Statement of Interest of the United
States, Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05 Civ. 10270);
Statement of Interest of the United States, Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 734 F.
Supp. 415 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 86-2255).
2.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290 (2010).
3.
Although the principles governing immunity of foreign officials in U.S.
courts will not necessarily be applied by foreign courts adjudicating the immunity of
U.S. officials, one can anticipate that foreign courts will reference U.S. practice in
establishing their own standards.
4.
For more on the distinction between status-based and conduct-based
immunity, see Chimène I. Keitner, Annotated Brief of Professors of Public International
Law and Comparative Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents in Samantar v.
Yousuf 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 609, 620–22 (2011) [hereinafter Keitner, Annotated
Brief]; Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN
BAG 2D 61, 62–68 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, Common Law]; Chimène I. Keitner,
Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE
1, 8–9 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, Officially Immune?].
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alleged conduct is attributable to the foreign state.5 Briefly stated,
conduct that is not attributable to the foreign state does not benefit
from immunity. Conduct that is solely attributable to the foreign
state and does not entail personal responsibility does benefit from
immunity.6 Conduct that entails both personal and state
responsibility might or might not benefit from immunity, depending
on other relevant factors.
The principle that certain conduct can entail both personal and
state responsibility is most evident in international criminal law,
which regularly imposes legal consequences on individuals for
conduct performed on behalf of the state.7 This principle is also
reflected in national prosecutions for international crimes, which can
be accompanied in some legal systems by claims for civil damages by
parties civiles.8 The current predominance of criminal penalties, as
opposed to civil penalties, for individuals alleged to have engaged in
internationally wrongful conduct has led some to treat civil and
criminal penalties as though they were fundamentally distinct.9
However, if a central concern of contemporary immunity doctrines is
to preclude one country’s courts from adjudicating the lawfulness of
another country’s conduct, then there seems to be little conceptual
difference between civil and criminal penalties, even though there
might be practical differences in the initiation and conduct of
proceedings. I discuss the implications of this observation in the
section on penalties.
The idea of presence highlights the difference between cases
involving defendants who remain outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the forum state, and those involving defendants who have entered the

5.
See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, Second Report on Immunity of State Officials
from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631
(June 10, 2010) (by Roman A. Kolodkin) (“[It is] right to use the criterion of the
attribution to the State of the conduct of an official in order to determine whether the
official has immunity ratione materiae and the scope of such immunity.”).
6.
Rosanne van Alebeek also distinguishes a category of conduct that is solely
attributable to the foreign state in her study of this topic. ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE
IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2008).
7.
To illustrate this principle, one need think only of the crimes perpetrated
with state authority by individuals who were part of the Nazi government in Germany
during World War II. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Oct. 6,
1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (establishing jurisdiction over such crimes).
8.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW STORIES 45, 71 n.110 (John A. Noyes et al. eds., 2007) (enumerating domestic
statutes).
9.
See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress in Support
of Petitioner at 5, 7–8, 42–46, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555)
(indicating lack of immunity from criminal proceedings but arguing for immunity from
civil proceedings for the same conduct); Brief of Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys
General of the United States in Support of Petitioner at 17–18, Samantar, 130 S. Ct.
2278 (No. 08-1555); United States Matar Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 24.
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forum state’s territory. When a defendant is physically present on the
forum state’s territory, then immunity represents a waiver of the
forum state’s plenary jurisdiction over individuals within its
territory.10 Absent such a waiver, individuals who enter U.S. territory
are subject to the plenary jurisdiction of U.S. courts.11
Finally, Part III suggests criteria that should guide lower courts
in determining an individual defendant’s entitlement to conductbased immunity. The Executive has currently declined to formulate
bright-line rules, although it has articulated a non-exhaustive list of
potentially relevant factors.12 If the Executive offers guidance in the
form of a suggestion of immunity, the court should give such a
suggestion substantial deference, particularly insofar as it conforms
to previously articulated criteria.13 However, the ultimate goal should
be to provide greater clarity to courts about how to weigh the legally
relevant considerations, so that they can make principled and
consistent determinations without executive intervention. Greater
clarity will also put potential defendants who are not entitled to
status-based immunity on heightened notice that traveling to, or
residing in, the United States might come at the cost of defending
themselves against criminal or civil proceedings in a U.S. court.
I. TYPES OF IMMUNITY CLAIMS AFTER SAMANTAR
After Samantar, a current or former foreign official named as a
defendant in a U.S. legal proceeding can raise one of four objections to
jurisdiction based on immunity. These immunity-based objections do
not preclude making other arguments for dismissal (such as the
absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, or
forum non conveniens), or raising an affirmative defense such as the
act of state doctrine.14 In brief, the four objections are:
(1)
The defendant can claim status-based immunity.
(2)
The defendant can claim conduct-based immunity.

10.
See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812) (clarifying that a nation’s jurisdiction within its territory is absolute and
exceptions to that jurisdiction require the nation’s consent).
11.
See id.
12.
See United States Samantar Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 7, 24–26.
13.
I have suggested elsewhere that the level of deference owed to the
Executive is different for status-based and conduct-based immunity. See Keitner,
Officially Immune?, supra note 4, at 3 n.15. For a more extensive discussion of the
Executive’s current role, see Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations
in U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915 (2011).
14.
For more on the act of state doctrine, see Keitner, Annotated Brief, supra
note 4, at 614–16.
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(3)
The defendant can claim that a foreign state or entity is a
required party under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 19(a)(1)(B), thus requiring
dismissal of the case under Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, if
the state or entity would be immune under the FSIA.15
(4)
The defendant can claim that the state is the real party in
interest by analogy to Kentucky v. Graham,16 if the relief sought
would run directly against the state. If the state is the real party in
interest, the claim against the individual defendant should be
dismissed based on common law immunity or failure to name the real
party in interest; the plaintiff might then be required to refile the
complaint against the state itself under the FSIA, subject to equitable
tolling.17 This option would not be available where a plaintiff sues a
defendant “in his personal capacity and seek[s] damages from his own
pockets.”18
The following three categories of defendants are generally
entitled to claim status-based immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts under objection one above:
Diplomats: Diplomatic agents (that is, heads of diplomatic
missions and members of the staff of diplomatic missions who have
diplomatic rank) are generally immune from the criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the receiving state under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.19 Other staff and household members enjoy
lesser forms of immunity under the Vienna Convention.20 In the
United States, the Vienna Convention has been implemented by the
Diplomatic Relations Act,21 with the proviso that “[t]he President
may, on the basis of reciprocity and under such terms and conditions
as he may determine, specify [diplomatic] privileges and
immunities . . . which result in more favorable treatment or less
favorable treatment than is provided under the Vienna
Convention.”22

15.
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Republic of the Philippines v.
Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 867 (2008)).
16.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985).
17.
See Keitner, Common Law, supra note 4, at 61 n.3 (noting that under the
domestic model of official capacity suits via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the state would be the
real party in interest where an official is sued in his or her official capacity); Keitner,
Officially Immune?, supra note 4, at 4 (identifying circumstances in which the state,
and not the individual, is the real party in interest).
18.
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2281.
19.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227 (entered into force with respect to the United States Dec. 13, 1972). In the
United States, this category may include certain members of UN Missions. See United
States Headquarters Agreement, S.J. Res. 144, 80th Cong. § 15 (1947).
20.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 19, arts.
37–38 (defining the privileges and immunities available to diplomatic agents’ family
members as well as the staff and servants of the members of the diplomatic mission).
21.
Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254a–e (2006).
22.
Id. § 254c.
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Incumbent Heads of State and Foreign Ministers: Customary
international law provides status-based immunity for incumbent
heads of state and foreign ministers.23 Incumbent heads of state have
successfully claimed status-based immunity from service of process in
the United States.24
Members of Special Diplomatic Missions: The United States is
not a party to the UN Convention on Special Missions.25 However, the
United States has previously suggested immunity from service of
process for certain invitees of the Executive Branch under the rubric
of “special mission immunity,”26 and it has indicated its intention to
continue doing so where specific criteria are met.27
Defendants who cannot claim status-based immunity (objection
one above) may instead claim conduct-based immunity (objection two
above). For example, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
provides current and former consular officials with conduct-based
immunity for acts performed in the exercise of their consular
functions,28 and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
provides former diplomats with immunity for acts performed in the
exercise of their functions as a member of the diplomatic mission.29
In sum, U.S. courts need only consider the “common law of
official immunity”30 referred to in Samantar when a current or
former official who is not entitled to status-based immunity, and
whose entitlement to conduct-based immunity is not otherwise
governed by treaty or statute, claims immunity from jurisdiction. A
central challenge is determining the sources and content of the

23.
See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, 24 (Feb. 14).
24.
See, e.g., Wei Ye v. Jiang Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding
Chinese President immune from service of process based on executive suggestion of
head of state immunity).
25.
Convention on Special Missions, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1969, 1400
U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force June 21, 1985); see also Status: Convention on Special
Missions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=III-9&chapter=3&lang=en#Participants
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
26.
See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest of the United
States at 11 n.9, Li Weixum v. Bo Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2006) (Civ. No. 040649 (RJL)) (suggesting immunity from service of process for invitee of the Executive
Branch but emphasizing that “[s]pecial mission immunity would not . . . encompass all
foreign official travel”).
27.
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Symposium: Foreign State Immunity at
Home and Abroad (Feb. 4, 2011).
28.
See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations arts. 43(1), 53(4), 71(1), Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
29.
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 19, art. 39(2).
30.
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290 (2010).
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common law principles that govern these residual, conduct-based
immunity claims.
II. THREE PRINCIPLES
In Samantar, the Supreme Court held unequivocally that the
FSIA does not govern individual immunity claims, but it was much
more circumspect about defining the “common law” that does govern
such claims.31 The Executive has taken the position that the common
law supports a historical practice of absolute deference to executive
suggestions of immunity or, if the Executive remains silent, judicial
application of “principles adopted by the Executive Branch, informed
by customary international law.”32 The Executive has, at present,
refrained from issuing an exhaustive or hierarchical list of such
principles, and has instead committed to developing such principles
over time.33
Advocates of absolute judicial deference to the Executive on
questions of both status-based and conduct-based immunity cite the
Court’s statement in Samantar that “[w]e have been given no reason
to believe that Congress saw as a problem, or wanted to eliminate,
the State Department’s role in determinations regarding individual
official immunity.”34 However, although the Samantar Court
described the State Department’s pre-FSIA role in suggesting
immunity for foreign vessels, it did not undertake its own analysis of
the State Department’s role in cases brought against foreign
individuals, nor did the Court need to define that role in order to
conclude that the FSIA was not intended to supplant it.35 If the
Supreme Court meant to endorse absolute executive deference, it
could easily have done so. Instead, it referred throughout its opinion
to the “common law” and made no mention of “principles adopted by
the Executive Branch,” despite having been urged by the United
States to do so. The precise role of the Executive post-Samantar thus
remains a matter of dispute, as evidenced by recent briefing on
remand in Samantar itself.36
I have taken issue elsewhere with the claim that there is a
consistent historical practice of absolute deference to the Executive on

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 2290.
United States Samantar Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 8.
Koh, supra note 25.
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291.
Id. at 2284–85.
The pleadings on remand are available at Pleadings: Yousuf v. Samantar,
CENTER FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&
type=142#U.S.%20District%20Court%20for%20the%20Eastern%20District%20of%20Vi
rginia%20%28On%20Remand%29 (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
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questions of individual conduct-based immunity.37 Even if there were
such a practice, it is unlikely that the “common law” is reducible to it.
Yet regardless of the degree of deference owed to executive
suggestions, the question remains of what principles ought to govern
conduct-based immunity—whether these principles are articulated
and applied by the Executive, by courts, or by some combination of
both. The rest of this Part identifies three such principles.
A. Personal Responsibility
Under both international law and U.S. law, individuals may be
held personally responsible for acts performed under color of foreign
law.38 Simply put, personal responsibility and state responsibility are
not mutually exclusive. The predicate for individual, conduct-based
immunity is thus not simply whether the alleged conduct is
attributable to the foreign state.39 If it were, then domestic criminal
prosecutions for international crimes committed by foreign officials
would also be barred by immunity, because many such crimes are
also attributable to the foreign state.
Those who advocate a zero-sum account of the relationship
between personal responsibility and state responsibility sometimes
cite a statement by the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).40 The Appeals
Chamber found that the ICTY does not have the authority to issue
subpoenas for the production of documents to current government
officials in their official capacity, because it lacks the power to impose
sanctions on states themselves in the event of noncompliance, given its

37.
See Keitner, Common Law, supra note 4, at 72 (describing the scant
authority regarding deference to the Executive on questions of conduct-based
immunity); see also Chimène I. Keitner, The Lost History of Foreign Official Immunity,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (exploring the Executive’s own understanding of
constitutional limitations on its ability to intervene in civil suits during the Founding
Era).
38.
For example, the crime of torture requires action under color of law. See
Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006).
39.
Article 7 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility attributes officials’ ultra vires conduct to the state, but Article 58 makes
clear that the provisions on attribution “are without prejudice to any question of the
individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a
State.” Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
Annex, arts. 7, 58, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (Draft Articles on State
Responsibility).
40.
See, e.g., United States Matar Amicus Brief, supra note 1, at 23.
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limited mandate.41 In finding the tribunal powerless to issue this type
of subpoena, the Appeals Chamber reasoned:
Such [current] officials are mere instruments of a State and their
official action can only be attributed to the State. They cannot be the
subject of sanctions or penalties for conduct that is not private but
undertaken on behalf of a State. In other words, State officials cannot
suffer the consequences of wrongful acts which are not attributable to
them personally but to the State on whose behalf they act: they enjoy
so-called “functional immunity.”42

This makes sense in the context of a discussion of a current official’s
compliance or noncompliance with a request to produce documents on
behalf of the state. However, it does not make sense in other contexts.
As the ICTY emphasized in the same opinion, “Those responsible for
[conduct within the tribunal’s jurisdiction] cannot invoke immunity
from national or international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated
such crimes while acting in their official capacity,” just as spies
“although acting as State organs, may be held personally accountable
for their wrongdoing.”43 Accordingly, state responsibility does not
automatically confer individual immunity from the jurisdiction of
international or domestic courts.
The United States has recognized the compatibility of state
action with personal responsibility in at least some cases. For
example, in a statement that pre-dates Samantar the United States
argued that: “if the defendant were correct that color of law can
simply be equated with sovereignty and that the FSIA is applicable in
all such cases, the torture statute would be rendered meaningless.
Such a result must be rejected.”44 In that case, which involved the
prosecution of Roy Belfast Jr. (a/k/a “Chuckie” Taylor) for torture in
Liberia, the Court agreed with the U.S. government that the
defendant could both act “in an official capacity” and still be held
personally responsible for his conduct by a U.S. court.45 Just as
personal responsibility does not necessarily equal a lack of immunity

41.
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108, Judgment on the Request
of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of the Trial Chamber of 18 July
1997, ¶ 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 29, 1997).
42.
Id.
43.
See id. ¶ 41; see also Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (defining “spies”); Regulations
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295 (Annex
to the Hague Convention No. IV).
44.
United States’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
the Indictment, United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2007),
at *1.
45.
See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793, 808 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The
Senate Executive Committee charged with evaluating the CAT aptly explained that
there is no distinction between the meaning of the phrases ‘under the color of law’
[used in the 28 U.S.C. § 2340] and in ‘an official capacity’ [used in CAT].”).
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(since immunity can depend on other factors), state responsibility
does not automatically entail individual immunity, and should not be
treated as though it does.
B. Presence
Individuals who enter U.S. territory do so with the consent of the
United States, and become subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S.
courts.46 Even accredited diplomats can be expelled by the United
States if they engage in unlawful conduct, and they can lose their
status-based immunity if they remain in the United States beyond a
specified grace period.47
Jurisdictional immunities accorded current or former foreign
officials are therefore an exception to the baseline principle of plenary
jurisdiction based on territorial presence.48 When proceedings are
brought against a defendant who is physically present within the
forum state (as opposed to a defendant who remains outside the
jurisdiction), the principle of plenary territorial jurisdiction comes
into play. The FSIA declines to recognize the immunity of the state
itself when tortious or criminal conduct takes place within U.S.
territory.49 Just as the location of the acts plays a role in determining
whether the exercise of the forum state’s jurisdiction to prescribe,
adjudicate, and enforce would be reasonable, so too does the location
of the defendant.
In its submission to the district court on remand in Samantar,
the United States emphasized that “[b]asic principles of
sovereignty . . . provide that a state generally has a right to exercise
jurisdiction over its residents.”50 The United States further opined
that “U.S. residents like Samantar who enjoy the protections of U.S.
law ordinarily should be subject to the jurisdiction of our courts,

46.
See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812) (discussing extent of a nation’s jurisdiction “within its own territory”).
47.
See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 19, art. 9
(stating that a receiving state may declare a member of the diplomatic staff to be
unacceptable); id. arts. 37(2)–(3), 38(1) (describing the extent of individual
immunities).
48.
For further discussion of the territorial principle, see Chimène I. Keitner,
Foreign Official Immunity and the “Baseline” Problem, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011).
49.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2006) (amended 2008) (denying immunity
where “damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious
act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state
while acting within the scope of his office or employment . . . .”).
50.
Statement of Interest of the United States at 9, Yousuf v. Samantar, No.
1:04cv1360 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007) (citing The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
at 136).
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particularly when sued by U.S. residents.”51 Due consideration of the
role of a defendant’s presence within U.S. territory also serves the
policy goal of ensuring that victims who have fled human rights
abuses in their countries of origin will not be compelled to live sideby-side with their former abusers, by deterring potential defendants
from traveling to, and especially taking up residence in, the United
States.52
C. Penalties
There is a tendency to differentiate axiomatically between
criminal and civil proceedings for immunity purposes, and to find
civil immunity even where criminal immunity would not exist.53
Where this result is not compelled by statute, it does not make sense.
If anything, one might expect criminal immunity to be more robust,
rather than less robust, than civil immunity, because the potential
consequences of criminal liability are more severe. For example, the
U.S. government expressed concern in its submission in Matar v.
Dichter that: “Even more worrisome, foreign criminal courts might
look to U.S. civil immunity rules in an effort to justify assertions of
jurisdiction over U.S. officials.”54 That said, because U.S. government
attorneys serve as gatekeepers in the criminal context, potential
defendants might view the possibility of being held civilly liable as
less predictable and, thus, more objectionable than the possibility of
being prosecuted in U.S. courts.
Governmental control over criminal prosecutions has led others
to draw a distinction between criminal and civil immunity. For
example, at least one circuit court has taken the position that
initiating a prosecution amounts to a denial of immunity.55 This

51.
Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 50, at 7.
52.
This policy is also reflected in U.S. asylum laws, which deny political
asylum in the United States to former persecutors. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006)
(defining “refugee” to exclude persecutors); id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (denying asylum status
to persecutors); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (granting Attorney General power to deport
persecutors).
53.
For example, in an English case decided after this symposium was
convened, the High Court stated in dicta that “[a]ll State officials enjoy immunity
ratione materiae for their official acts from the civil jurisdiction of the courts of other
States,” but found that there was no such immunity from criminal jurisdiction. See
Khurts Bat v. Investigating Judge, [2011] EWHC (Admin) 2029, [71], [101] (Eng.)
(citing United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, Annex, art 1(b)(iv), U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 16, 2004),
which is not yet in force and has not been signed or ratified by the United States, for
support).
54.
United States Matar Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 22 n.20.
55.
See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997)
(interpreting prosecution by the Executive Branch as a “clear sentiment” that
immunity should be denied).
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seems somewhat problematic, particularly if, for example, the United
States sought to prosecute a recognized, sitting head of state who is
entitled to status-based immunity under customary international
law. Moreover, it is not clear that prosecutorial discretion is the best
form of executive gatekeeping where foreign official defendants are
concerned. As former Acting State Department Legal Adviser Michael
Matheson has observed, “[T]he fact is that the process of indictments
in the U.S. system is not well integrated with foreign policy
concerns.”56 The myth of a unitary and coordinated Executive seems
an insufficient reason to differentiate between civil and criminal
proceedings for immunity purposes.
In his opinion in Jones v. Saudi Arabia—a challenge to which is
currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights—Lord
Bingham of the UK House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court)
distinguished civil from criminal proceedings on the grounds that a
state’s interests are affected by civil proceedings, but not by criminal
proceedings.57 This rationale also seems unpersuasive. If the state is
the real party in interest, then the individual might not be the proper
defendant in a civil suit. However, the state is not always the real
party in interest. Where the state’s interests are affected in some
symbolic or indirect way, this is surely no different in a civil
proceeding than it is in a criminal case. In fact, the potential offense
to the foreign state seems greater in the criminal context, at least
where U.S. courts are involved, because only government authorities
can initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, from a diplomatic
perspective, responsibility for the proceedings cannot be deflected
onto private parties or onto the judicial branch.
Perhaps most puzzling, proponents of blanket civil immunity
appear to acknowledge that criminal immunity is unwarranted in
certain cases.58 If there is no immunity from criminal proceedings,
then it is not clear as a doctrinal matter why there would
nevertheless be immunity from civil proceedings for the same
conduct.59

56.
MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN
TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT
LEGAL ADVISER 94 (2010).
57.
See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006]
UKHL 26, [31], [2007] 1 A.C. 270 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“A state is not
criminally responsible in international or English law”; however, “a civil action . . . does
indirectly implead the state”). The UK court of appeal had found that the foreign state
was no more “impleaded” by civil proceedings for torture than by criminal proceedings
for the same conduct. See Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1394, [2005] Q.B. 699 [75]–[76], [127]–[28] (Eng.).
58.
See sources cited supra note 9.
59.
The only remaining basis for distinction, which I have criticized elsewhere,
is the assumption that there is a “baseline” of immunity from both civil and criminal
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III. FACTORS TO CONSIDER
The principles canvassed above, and the immunity practices of
the United States, suggest that it can be useful to ask the following
questions in order to determine whether or not a particular individual
who is not covered by an existing treaty or statute is entitled to
conduct-based immunity as a matter of common law:
1.
Has the foreign government, recognized as such by the U.S.
Department of State, requested immunity? If the answer is “no,” or if
the foreign state has waived immunity, then the consensus appears to
be that there should be no immunity, because immunity is for the
benefit of the state, not the individual.60 Although this appears to
leave former officials at the “mercy” of subsequent domestic regime
changes, the same is true of the possibility that such officials could
face legal proceedings in their own country’s courts for wrongdoings
committed by a prior regime.
As a procedural matter, a request for immunity should first be
addressed to the State Department.61 That said, it is foreseeable that
certain foreign governments will make representations to courts
directly, in which case courts will have to ascertain whether the
government is “recognized” by the United States. Either way, the
burden should be on the defendant to ensure that his or her
government is made aware of the legal proceedings, and intervenes in
a timely fashion.
If the foreign government has requested immunity, then courts
should go on to ask:
2.
Is the alleged conduct attributable to the foreign state? If the
answer is “no,” then there should be no conduct-based immunity from
either criminal or civil proceedings. Even proponents of a robust form
of immunity do not suggest that there ought to be immunity where
the state bears no responsibility for the alleged conduct, because
immunity is for the benefit of the state.62
3.
If the alleged conduct is attributable to the foreign state, was
it performed with actual (as opposed to apparent, or no) authority?
This might be a difficult question to answer at the margins, but it will

proceedings, and that this immunity has been eroded solely in the case of criminal
proceedings. See Keitner, supra note 48. There would, however, be an incongruity in
allowing criminal jurisdiction while precluding civil jurisdiction for the same claims.
60.
Cf. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
Reports 3, 21–22, 25–26 (Feb. 14) (explaining that immunities are not granted for
personal benefit of the diplomatic official, and that the sending state may waive that
immunity in a foreign court).
61.
This became the established practice in suits involving foreign ships. See
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284 (2010) (citing Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 581 (1943)).
62.
See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 28, art 43(1);
supra text accompanying note 28.
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inevitably involve, to a certain extent, taking a foreign state’s
representations about the individual’s scope of authority at face
value. If the conduct was not performed with actual authority, or was
ultra vires, then there should be no conduct-based immunity from
either criminal or civil proceedings, even if the conduct is also
attributable to the state.63 Immunity should only protect exercises of
state authority that the foreign state embraces as such.
In my view, only if the answer to each of these three questions is
“yes” does the question of immunity become tricky: i.e., when a
recognized foreign government has requested immunity, the conduct
is attributable to the foreign state, and the conduct was performed
with actual authority. Notably, reasoning about immunity as a
matter of “common law” under these conditions does not turn on
whether the proceedings are civil or criminal in nature.64 From a U.S.
perspective, reciprocity concerns are the same—and might even be
heightened—if a current or former U.S. official is subjected to foreign
criminal proceedings, as opposed to proceedings that could only result
in the award of money damages.65
Two additional factors seem especially relevant to the decision of
whether to recognize immunity in these difficult cases:
4.
Was the defendant served or arrested while within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States? Although immunity is for
the benefit of the foreign state rather than the individual, the United
States maintains plenary jurisdiction over individuals who have
entered its territory.66 The more sustained the individual’s presence
within U.S. territory, the stronger the United States’ claim to exercise
territorial jurisdiction might appear. Technically speaking, however,
physical presence of any duration will suffice.67
Individuals who are not entitled to status-based immunity might
need to think twice before entering the United States if they have

63.
The non-binding Draft Articles on State Responsibility do not compel a
different result. See G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 39, art. 7 (attributing state officials’
ultra vires conduct to the state so long as the person or entity acts in an official
capacity); id. art. 58 (indicating that attribution to the state is “without prejudice” to
the question of individual responsibility).
64.
See supra Part II.C.
65.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
66.
See Keitner, supra note 48, at 9 (“The territorial theory . . . starts with a
baseline of plenary jurisdiction by the forum state over its territory and individuals
present on that territory . . . .”); supra text accompanying note 48.
67.
See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 608, 628 (1990) (finding
that personal jurisdiction based upon personal service of a summons and complaint on
an individual physically present within a state in the United States comports with due
process requirements); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246, 248 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding
personal jurisdiction over defendant who was served during a brief visit to the United
States).
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previously engaged in illegal conduct. Conversely, if an individual
defendant was not served or arrested within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, then the United States’ plenary
jurisdiction over its own territory does not serve as a counterweight
to a foreign state’s claim to conduct-based immunity for its agent,
assuming the alleged conduct occurred overseas. As a practical
matter, it is also unlikely that a U.S. court would have personal
jurisdiction over the absent defendant in such a case.
5.
Has Congress attached legal consequences to the alleged
conduct? Congress has criminalized conduct including torture, war
crimes, genocide, use of child soldiers, aircraft hijacking, and child
sex trafficking, even when this conduct occurs outside U.S.
territory.68 Some of this conduct, including torture and extrajudicial
killing, can also entail civil liability under U.S. law.69 These statutes,
although they do not explicitly abrogate conduct-based immunity,
embody a political determination that such conduct is harmful and
should be discouraged, wherever it occurs.70 Courts may justifiably
look to such statutes in weighing whether or not to recognize conductbased immunity in a particular case.
My current view is that if the defendant was served or arrested
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and Congress
has attached legal consequences to the alleged conduct, then there
should be a presumption of no conduct-based immunity. This
formulation certainly does not answer all possible questions, but the
public and clear articulation of these factors would at least serve to
put individuals on notice about the potential legal consequences of
travel to the United States.
An alternative approach is to grant blanket immunity for all
conduct attributable to the state, absent a waiver from the foreign
state. In my view, this would excessively restrict the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts. At the other end of the spectrum, one could deny conductbased immunity for all congressionally proscribed conduct, and
perhaps for all internationally unlawful conduct as well. In my view,
this would create excessive legal exposure, particularly in light of
reciprocity concerns. In the middle of the spectrum, one could grant
immunity to agents of our strategic allies and trading partners, and

68.
Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d) (2006); Torture
Convention Implementation Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2006); War Crimes
Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006); Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18
U.S.C. § 2442 (2006).
69.
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
70.
Certain “violations of the law of nations” also carry the potential for civil
liability under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), although the specific
types of conduct that entail such liability have thus far been subject to judicial, rather
than legislative, specification. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)
(discussing criteria used by courts for analyzing claims under this statute).
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deny it to others. This concept is reflected to a certain extent in the
state sponsors of terrorism exception to the FSIA, which exposes
those states to greater legal liability because of purely political
considerations.71 However, such an uneven application of immunity
would remove any pretense of impartiality in the application of
neutral principles, and would also undermine our ability to argue for
immunity based on reciprocity when U.S. officials face legal
proceedings in inhospitable fora. Difficult as it might be, we should
strive to find a principled middle ground, and to give potential
defendants notice about the criteria that will be applied to determine
whether immunity is likely to be available if they enter the United
States.

71.
See Terrorism Exception to the Jurisdictional Immunity of a Foreign State,
28 U.S.C. § 1605(A) (2006) (creating exception for state sponsors of terrorism).

